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Abstract
This paper deals with a case study on the social security system in a transition economy
in Ukraine. The severe socioeconomic crisis in Ukraine, including a huge decline of
production, hyperinflation, and the informalization of the economy, caused both a
substantial reduction of social security contributions and an increase in the number of
people who need assistance. The creation of a new sustainable economic system in the
country requires the development of a new model of social security suited to the realities
of a market economy. The objective of this paper is to investigate the current situation,
trends, and possible ways of reforms in the Ukrainian social security system, taking into
account specific features of the national economy, in particular the informal sector. The
analysis focuses on the key component of social security - the pension system - and
combines both qualitative and model-based approaches.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is an extremely complex
process, comprising all spheres of society. It changes the society at every level – from
the psychological to macroeconomic, it destroys the old social system and leads,
through the severe socioeconomic crisis, to the creation of a new system. This process is
most painful for the inactive part of the population (the elderly and disabled, the
unemployed), for whom it is very hard to adapt to the new situation. Social security
issues are therefore of great importance for a transition economy.
Social security systems serve two main functions: the redistributive function
through the direct transfer of funds to the inactive part of the population, and the
accumulative function through the creation of possibilities for workers to save money
for the inactive periods of their lives. At the time of transition these functions are
conflicting. Maintaining the redistributive function in a time of economic crisis requires
very high social security taxes, which discourage private saving. These taxes, moreover,
are one factor leading to an increase in the informal sector of the economy, which in
turn diminishes the contribution base. The creation of a new sustainable economic
system requires allocation of appropriate resources to adapt the social security system to
the new socioeconomic context. The introduction of individual insurance principles in
the social security system could increase personal interest and personal responsibility of
a worker for his/her standard of living after retirement, stimulate private savings, and
substantially promote economic development by eliminating the incentives to
informalize production and employment (Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995).
However, such social security reform is costly.
Informalization of the economy was mentioned twice in the previous paragraph,
thus it is appropriate to discuss this phenomenon and its relationship to social security.
Three basic types of informal activities can be mentioned. First, there are economic
activities that are informal by their nature, as they are defined as criminal by society
(“black markets”). Second, there are untaxed activities of small and large enterprises,
which should have been taxed according to legislation (production of legal goods and
services). Third, there are informal activities serving as a survival mechanism for the
poorest part of the population (work on private land, etc.). Obviously, the first type
2should not be used for any social security purposes. Other informal activities might be
acceptable in a transition period, but should be eliminated in the future. The second type
promotes economic development in the short term, while the new economic system has
not yet been formed, but in long term it encourages corruption, slows down the
development of the banking system, diminishes the state budget, and increases financial
risks. The third type serves as a coping mechanism in periods of crisis, but represents an
ineffective use of both capital and labor in the long term. Thus, in the long term the
decrease of the informal sector in the economy might significantly improve the financial
reserves of the social security system due to the direct expansion of the contribution
base as well as an improvement of the general economic environment.
The Ukrainian social security system still maintains many features of the former
Soviet Union and includes pensions, maternity and sickness benefits, unemployment
benefits and job search assistance, allowances for families with children, and assistance
for victims of Chernobyl accident. A huge drop of production in the national economy
(according to the data of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, the real GDP in
1997 decreased by 54.3% compared to 1990), hyperinflation (in 1991-95 the inflation
index was between 280 and 10,260% per year), and informalization of the economy
(according to different estimations, the informal sector comprises 40-60% of the
economy) caused a substantial reduction of social expenditures. Now, as the worst part
of the crisis is over and economic prospects are improving, the problem of the long-term
stability of the key components of the national economy, including the social security
system, is on the national agenda.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the current situation, trends, and
possible ways of reforms in the Ukrainian social security system taking into account
specific features of the national economy, in particular the informal sector. The analysis
focuses on the key component of the social security, the pension system. Section 2
examines the current situation, trends and needs of reform in the system, focusing on the
level of income and expenditures of the Pension Fund, current number of retirees and
pension level, demographic trends in the country and their possible impact on future
sustainability of the pension system, and equity and fairness issues. Section 3 discusses
the methodology of model-based analysis of the pension system, including the
definition of analysis targets, discussing assumptions on the development of the
system’s macroeconomic environment, and issues related to the adaptation of the model
developed within the Social Security Reform project at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), to the Ukrainian case study. The latter topic
includes, in particular, accounting of the informal sector of the economy and modeling
governmental debt. Section 4 is devoted to the description of proposed scenarios, and
presentation and analysis of simulation results. The conclusions and possible directions
for further research are presented in the last section. The detailed description of the
Ukrainian pension system (including the description of the administrative and
legislative structure, particular types of pensions, criteria for pension assignment and
social security taxes), model specification, and parameterization are provided in the
appendices.
32. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UKRAINIAN PENSION SYSTEM
This section analyses the current state, trends, and needs for improvement in the
Ukrainian pension system. A detailed description of the system is provided in Appendix
1. In brief, the Ukrainian pension system is based on a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG)
principle, according to which social security taxes contributing to the Pension Fund are
paid out to retirees immediately. The social security tax ratio is 33% of wages, 32% of
which are paid by the employers and 1% by the employees. Standard retirement age in
Ukraine is 60 years for men and 55 years for women, the working record necessary to
get full pension is 25 years for men and 20 years for women.
2.1. Income and expenditures of the Pension Fund of Ukraine
Despite the fact that the share of Pension Fund expenditures in GDP remained
practically constant during the years of transition (Figure 1), the deep economic crisis
taking place in Ukraine during the past several years made an inevitable impact on the
financial state of the pension system. The drop of production resulted in a sharp
reduction of the real budget of the Pension Fund (Figure 2). As a result of the
informalization of the economy and delays in payment of wages, 7 million working
people do not contribute or contribute later to the Pension Fund, and there are 929
retirees per 1,000 people contributing de-facto to the Fund (Libanova and Yatsenko,
1997).
Apart from "external" factors due to the general crisis of the national economy,
there are also "internal" factors in the pension system. These factors have negative
effects on the system's financial state, in particular, the proportion of time between the
period of contribution to the Pension Fund and the period of pension payment (see
Section 2.5).
At the same time, one of the disadvantages of the Ukrainian pension system is
the very high level of contributions to the Pension Fund paid by the employers. These
contributions are 32% of the total amount of wages, with 15.5% of this being paid to the
employment fund, the social insurance fund, and the fund for the victims of the
Chernobyl disaster. This makes employers informalize employment, which, in turn, has
a negative impact on both the pension system and the national economy as a whole.
2.2. Pension level
A reduction of pension level has taken place (Figures 3, 4) as a result of the reduction in
real contributions to the Pension Fund. In early 1997 the average pension (51.9
hryvnias; approximately USD 28) was about the same as the minimum cost of food
(52.3 hrn), and 12.7 million retirees (87.6% of the total number) received a pension that
was less than the minimum consumption level (70.9 hrn). The minimum old-age labor
pension is 16.62 hrn. The above-mentioned delays in wage payments also caused non-
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Figure 1. Expenditures of the Pension Fund of Ukraine (in % of formal GDP).
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine,
calculations made by the author.
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Figure 2. Expenditures of the Pension Fund of Ukraine (in real prices).
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine,
calculations made by the author.
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Figure 3. Average monthly pension in Ukraine (in real prices, at the beginning of the
year).
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine,
calculations made by the author.
Figure 4. Average monthly pension in Ukraine (related to average wage, at the
beginning of the year).
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine,
calculations made by the author.
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6payments to the Pension Fund and, as a result, a debt in pension payments, which
amounted to 1.8 billion hrn in March 1998. Hence, the living standard provided by the
Ukrainian pension system for the retirees can be judged as very poor.
2.3. Retirement age and working record
In the 1990s the Ukrainian parliament accepted a series of legislative acts that
increased the number of people entitled to early retirement (representatives of about 20
professions have such an entitlement nowadays). As a result, the real average retirement
age decreased to 58 years for men and to 54 years for women. The average working
record (according to official data for 1996) was 36 years for men and 29 years for
women, and the real average term of contributions to the Pension Fund was 30 years for
men and 21 years for women. The life expectancy after the average retirement age is
15.1 years for men and 23.1 years for women. Taking into account that an average for a
relatively short-term salary is used to calculate a pension, there is the possibility that an
individual’s pension would considerably exceed his/her contributions to the Pension
Fund (Libanova and Yatsenko, 1997).
One of the ways to improve the situation could be to raise the retirement age.
However, two factors need to be taken into account: first, as a result of the deteriorating
economic and ecological conditions, the life expectancy for the Ukrainian population
decreased by 3.4 years between 1990 and 1996, and was 67.1 years in early 1997 (men:
61.6, women: 72.8); second, there is a rising rate of unemployment in the country, and
an increase in retirement age might strengthen this trend.
However, there is one more issue associated with the problem of real retirement
age. According to Ukrainian law, working retirees keep receiving pensions. In 1997
there were 2147 thousand working retirees (14.8% of the total number). Among those,
918,400 received wages less than the average wage in Ukraine, 681,600 received
between one and two average wages, and 162,900 received more than two average
wages. The highest increase in the labor force participation rate was observed in early
retirement age groups – for example, for population aged 60-64 the rates increased from
32% to 77% between 1989 and 1995 for men, and from 14% to 67% for women
(Riboud and Chu, 1996). Due to the crisis in the financial state of the pension system it
would probably be reasonable to change the legislative regulations in this respect.
2.4. Number of retirees and population aging: Contemporary status and
trends
There was a clear trend showing an increase in the number of retirees in Ukraine in the
first half of the 1990s (Table 1).
One of the reasons for this trend was the recently adopted laws, which decreased
the real average retirement age. In addition, the increasing number of retirees in Ukraine
is caused by a series of demographic factors making this development a long-term trend.
7Table 1. Number of retirees in Ukraine (in thousands, beginning of the year).
1986 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Old age retirees 8,541 9,713 10,294 10,737 10,865 10,668 10,615 10,587
Invalidity
retirees
1,352 1,313 1,355 1,388 1,477 1,734 1,814 1,868
Survivor retirees
1,522 1,209 1,044 1,155 1,236 1,228 1,195 1,163
Years of service
retirees
n.a. n.a. 361 379 398 415 429 443
Social retirees
- 318 500 532 501 470 434 426
Total 12,038 13,084 13,554 14,191 14,477 14,515 14,487 14,487
% from total
population 23.7 25.2 26.0 27.2 27.7 28.1 28.2 28.5
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine
n.a.  - data not available
Since the 1960s the level of fertility in Ukraine has been below replacement level; this
caused the development of the process of population aging (Figure 5). In 1959 the ratio
between people older than the working age and people of working age was 0.227, in
1997 it reached 0.411. However, in the following years some improvement of this
indicator is expected. This is due to the fact that only a small number of people born
during World War II will reach their retirement age. As of 2005 the situation will start
to deteriorate considerably. The generation born during the post-war "baby boom"
period (1946-1960) will then be beyond working age, and the working age will be
reached by the generation born in the 1990s, the period of essential reduction in fertility
(Figure 6). We used the IIASA Population Projections model (Lutz et. al., 1996) to
simulate the demographic pressure ratio for the next 30 years. The results of the
simulation show that the demographic pressure on the working age population will
essentially increase (Figure 7). As shown in Riboud and Chu (1996), sustainability of
the PAYG pension system under such conditions will decrease substantially in the long
run.
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Figure 5. Age structure of the population of Ukraine (1959-1997).
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine.
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
<HDU
R
at
io
 (p
er
 
1,
00
0 
pe
o
pl
e
)
Fertility
Mortality
Figure 6. Fertility and mortality in Ukraine (per 1,000 people, 1950-1997).
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Ukraine, State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine.
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Figure 7. Forecast of demographic pressure ratio in Ukraine.
Source: see the text
2.5. Equity and fairness
The pension system of Ukraine has considerable disadvantages from the viewpoint of
equity and fairness (UNDP, 1996, 1997). First of all, this system does not provide the
necessary correlation between work itself and its benefits. There is only a 1% deduction
from each person’s earnings that goes to the Pension Fund. Moreover, there are no
individual records for such payments. The working record requirements that should be
fulfilled to get a full pension are too generous. To calculate a pension level, the average
monthly wages over a short period of time are taken into account. There is a maximum
pension level, but there is no maximum wage level above which earnings do not require
contributions to the Pension Fund. The differentiation of pension levels is socially
unfair: on the one hand, the disadvantages of legislation and the lack of money in the
Pension Fund resulted in a very low maximum pension level and led to the situation
where for most retirees the duration of their working record and their average wage
level were not reflected in the pension level; on the other hand, according to "status"
laws of Ukraine, certain categories of people can get pensions that are several times as
higher than the usual maximum pension level.
The social unfairness of the pension system, together with its financial crisis,
leads to the aggravation of the generations conflict. The current generation of retirees,
who used to finance the old pension system during their working life, receive a pension
of much lower purchasing power than in previous years. At the same time, the current
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working population realize that in case the current pension system is maintained, they
will most likely not have an opportunity to receive an appropriate pension, which leads
to increasing reluctance of the taxpayers to finance this system.
2.6. Necessity and complexity of the pension reform
The existing Ukrainian pension system still maintains many features of the former
Soviet system and has some essential disadvantages that make its effective functioning
under present conditions impossible. The conservation of this system will lead to a
series of negative consequences, including:
• A further deterioration of the living standards of retirees;
• The necessity of a further increase in social security taxes, and, as a result, the
growth of expenses for the labor force, a reduction of the labor market, and an
increase of the informal sector in the economy;
• The necessity to increase budget expenses for the pension system, and, as a result,
an increase of the budget deficit, and a reduction of budget expenditures in other
spheres such as health care, science, and education, which will lead to a deceleration
of economic growth;
• The aggravation of the generations conflict.
Thus, there is a necessity to undertake pension reform in Ukraine. The introduction
of insurance principles to the system would solve, at least partially, the above-
mentioned problems. At the same time, there are further problems complicating these
measures, such as
• The macroeconomic instability in the state, an insufficient development of financial
institutions, and, as a result, absence of necessary mechanisms of saving;
• The low income of most people of working age, which does not give them an
opportunity to save money for their future (UNDP, 1997);
• The lack of economic knowledge and skills in a considerable part of the population.
Many people are certain that the state must provide pensions, do not have enough
foresight to distribute their income throughout life, and are not able to estimate long-
term solvency of pension funds;
• The low level of trust of the population to both state and private financial structures;
• The impossibility of insuring against many risks (inflation, economic recession,
investment mistakes, long life etc.);
• The lack of professionals in the field of pension insurance.
Thus, planning and implementation of pension reform in Ukraine is a complex
problem that involves searching for a compromise between necessary and possible
ways.
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3. METHODOLOGY OF THE MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS
3.1. The analysis targets
The analysis in the previous section of the recent trends and current situation in the
Ukrainian pension system clearly shows that the country’s policymakers will most
likely have to solve in the nearest future the complex problem of the introduction of a
“defined-contributions” component in the system. However, to stimulate development
of this component the government should decrease the social security tax. However, a
decrease of the social security tax rate will obviously lead to a decline of income of the
current retirees. But this income is already so low that an attempt to reduce it even
further will definitely lead to a failure of the reform. Therefore, the government should
be ready to compensate the retirees for their losses during the reform, or, in other words,
pay the costs of reform. The question is, where to get money for this endeavor? The
government will most likely borrow money for this purpose, that is, it will increase the
governmental debt. In this case the debt level, or, more exactly, the level of the interest
payments that should be paid for this debt, will be an important indicator of success or
failure of the reform.
One more significant question is which factors might influence the success or
the failure of the reform? As was discussed previously, one of the reasons for the crisis
in the current pension system is the huge share of the informal sector in the economy.
What impact will the informalization of the economy have on the pension reform?  Is it
possible to undertake the reform if the informal sector’s share will remain the same? If
not, by how much should it be decreased to make the reform possible? These questions
will be the focus of our simulations. Composing the scenarios for these simulations, we
shall also take into account two more factors. First, the government might use different
strategies regarding the term of reforms. On the one hand, a slow decrease of the social
security tax will place less pressure on government finances then a fast one, which is
due to the prolongation of the period of paying the cost of the reform. But, on the other
hand, because the current tax rate is too high, it will slow down economic development.
Which term of the reform is possible for different assumptions on changes in the
informal sector’s share? Second, the issue that is discussed now in the country is an
increase of the retirement age. Obviously, the raising of the retirement age will have a
significant financial impact on the stability of the public PAYG system. Moreover, as
was shown before, most people do not give up their jobs until the age of 65, so even the
cancellation of pensions for working people will de-facto mean a considerable increase
of the retirement age. However, under conditions of decline in life expectancy and after
the loss of savings by the oldest part of the population due to hyperinflation, for political
reasons the policymakers will be very cautious with any decisions in this direction
(people in the retirement age bracket constitute 40% of the present electorate). Another
important question is the relative impacts on the pension system of changes in the
retirement age and changes in the share of the informal sector in total economic activity.
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3.2. Assumptions on the macroeconomic environment
The starting point of the analysis is the current situation. The macroeconomic
environment can be described as follows: hyperinflation has been stopped (annual
inflation was about 25% in 1997), the budget deficit is expected to be about 3% of
formal GDP, the formal GDP declined until 1997, but a modest increase was observed
in the first half of 1998. Regarding structural reforms, most domestic prices have been
liberalized, trade has been liberalized, and most small-scale privatization has been
completed.
The basic assumption for the following years is that the government will
continue its efforts on reforming the economy. The budget deficit will be maintained at
the same level, inflation will decline, and structural reforms will be continuously
implemented, including progress in privatization, gradual reduction in the size of the
budgetary sector, and full liberalization of trade. Under these assumptions Ukraine
could resume economic growth (Riboud and Chu, 1996), which is assumed to be 3-6%
during the next 10 years. Analyzing the results of simulations, we should realize that
these assumptions are rather optimistic. However, since the sustainable development of
the fully funded defined-contribution pension system is impossible in conditions of
economic stagnation, it seems reasonable to use them.
3.3. Adaptation of the IIASA SSR model for the case study
3.3.1. Model description
The adapted variant of the IIASA SSR model (MacKellar and Reisen, 1998b; specified
in Appendix 2) was used for the simulations.
Age-specific saving and labor force participation rates are exogenous; thus, the
IIASA model in its present form is essentially an accounting model. For a given
population size, the age structure has three effects on per capita income: first, through
the labor force as it affects the number of workers relative to nonworkers; second,
through capital formation, as it affects the number of savers relative to dissavers; and,
third, through capital formation, as it affects the wage rate and rate of return to capital,
which in turn determine the income streams that give rise to saving. Concentrating on
relatively detailed age-structure effects, the model is based on analyses (e.g., Cutler et
al., 1990; Börsch-Supan, 1996), where the impact of population aging is mediated
through the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) of household consumption. Given theoretical
ambiguities, a simple accounting model with ample demographic detail provides a
useful benchmark for work with more economically sophisticated, but demographically
sparse, models.
As illustrated in Table 2, the model tracks receipts and disbursements, and thus
net savings, by institutional sector (households, firms, government). Capital consists of
13
Table 2. Sources of savings.
Households
1. Population in  working age
2. Population in retirement age
Receipts Receipts
   Compensation of employees
   Entrepreneurial income (net of depreciation and indirect tax)
   Imputed housing services (net of depreciation and indirect tax)
   Transfers incl. bequests (from pop. in retirement age)
   Compensation of employees
   Annuity payments from PPS and OIs
   Social security benefits
Disbursements Disbursements
   Direct tax
   Workers’ social security contributions
   Employers’ social security contributions
   Workers’ contributions to private pension plans
   Employers’ contributions to private pension plans
   Consumption
       From after-tax compensation of employees
       From after-tax entrepreneurial income
       Imputed housing services
       From transfers incl. bequests
    Direct tax
    Workers’ social-security contributions
    Employers’ social-security contributions
    Workers’ contributions to private pension plans
    Employers’ contributions to private pension  plans
    Consumption
       From after-tax compensation of employees
       From annuity income
       From social security benefits
    Transfers incl. bequests (to pop. aged 15-59)
3. Private Pension System (PPS) 4. Other Institutions (OI)
Receipts Receipts
   Dividends distributed from profits on capital
   Workers’ contributions to PPS
   Employers’ contributions to PPS
Disbursements
   Annuity payments to retirees
   Dividends distributed from profits on capital
   Capital returns to residential capital and capital
operated by PUEs  (portion owned by retirement age
population  only)
Disbursements
    Annuity payments to population  in retirement age
Capital operated by firms
    Residential capital and capital  operated by PUEs
Net savings of households (sum of receipts minus disbursements over 1-4)
Firms
Receipts
   Profits on capital
Disbursements
   Direct tax to government
   Dividends distributed to holders of claims
Net savings of firms
Government
Receipts
Direct taxes
Indirect taxes
Employers’ contributions to social security
Workers’ contributions to social security
Disbursements
Government consumption
Social security benefits
Net savings of government
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residential capital, capital operated by private unincorporated enterprises (PUEs), and
capital operated by firms (i.e., corporate enterprises). Imputed rents (in the case of
residential capital) and the profits of PUEs accrue directly to households. Firms earn
profits, pay taxes, and distribute dividends to holders of claims.
These claims are held on behalf of households by two financial intermediaries:
the fully funded defined-contribution pension system (DCPS) and other institutions
(OIs). When receipts and expenditures are summed across households of working age,
households of retirement age, the DCPS, and OIs, cancellations result in the net
household savings accounting concept, which is used in national accounts. The DCPS
represents fully funded, defined-contribution pension plans. OIs include banks,
insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial intermediaries apart from
pension funds. Implicitly, OIs also include individual households, to the extent that the
latter hold financial claims directly.
Flows of income from capital must ultimately be allocated to households. The
capital stock as a whole is divided into portions owned by the working-age and
retirement-age population. The shares used to apportion the capital stock between the
working- and retirement-age populations are functions of the age distribution of the
population, the rate of economic growth, and the rate of return to capital (MacKellar and
Reisen, 1998b).
The important feature of the articulation of savings is that the model is able to
track the downward pressure on household saving and capital accumulation that is
expected as the baby boomers begin to retire (Schieber and Shoven, 1994). Persons in
the working age bracket do not consume out the dividends that are distributed from
earnings on the capital they own (i.e., the DCPS and OIs that hold claims on behalf of
persons in retirement age brackets do not pass them on to the claimants). Persons in
retirement age, whether they are still working or not, are assumed to annuitize their
portion of the capital stock, meaning that they receive (from the DCPS and OIs) an
annuity that depends on the current rate of return to capital, the amount of capital they
own, and life expectancy at retirement age. In the case of capital operated by firms, the
DCPS and OIs receive dividends on, and pay out the annuity value of, the retirement-
age population´s assets. In the case of assets consisting of residential capital and capital
operated by PUEs, it is similarly assumed that the OIs play the intermediary role.
Persons of working age earn wages, out of which they and their employers make
pension and social security contributions; they also earn profits on PUEs and receive
imputed services from their share of the stock of owner-occupied housing. Persons in
the retirement age bracket, in addition to receiving wages (if they work), receive annuity
income from the DCPS and OIs based on their assets, and receive social security
benefits.
Persons of retirement age transfer unspent income from all sources to the
population of working age; in this way, the model “annualizes” bequests.
The public social security system is assumed to be a balanced PAYG system,
i.e., social security contributions collected from workers are spread over the elderly
population. Intrafamily transfers from children to parents, which may be an important
part of old-age support, are implicitly included under the public PAYG pension system.
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3.3.2. Taking into account the informal sector of the economy
The best way to take into account the informal sector of the economy would be the
development of a two-sectoral model with separate production functions for the formal
and the informal sector. However, the implementation of such an approach needs a lot
of data on parameters of the informal sector of the economy that we do not have at the
moment. Therefore, we used a one-sector model, but included the production of the
informal sector in the GDP:
GDP(t)=OfficialGDP(t)/(1-InformalSectorShare(t))
and adjusted tax rates, including the social security tax rate, to reflect the share of the
formal sector in the economy.
DirTaxRate(t)=OfficialDirTaxRate(t)*(1-InformalSectorShare(t))
IndirTaxRate(t)=OfficialIndirTaxRate(t)*(1-InformalSectorShare(t))
SocSecurityTaxRate(t)=OfficialSocSecurityTaxRate(t)*(1-InformalSectorShare(t))
3.3.3. Modeling governmental debt
The model was also modified to take into account the fiscal implications of the social
security reform.
The governmental debt for year t is calculated as the sum of the debt and deficit
for the previous year:
GovDebt(t) = GovDebt(t-1) + GovDeficit(t-1)
The governmental deficit is the difference between disbursements and receipts of
the government:
GovDeficit(t)=GovDisbursements(t)-GovReceipts(t)
The disbursements of the government are the sum of government consumption,
social security payments, targeted income support transfers designed to return to retirees
their losses incurred by the decrease of the social security tax rate, and interest
payments:
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Disbursements(t)=GovConsumption(t)+SocSecBenefits(t)+TargIncSupTrans(t)+
+IntPayments(t)
The targeted income support transfers are calculated as the difference between
total average pension in the case of reform (which includes two components: one
provided by the PAYG pension system and one from the defined-contribution pension
system) and average social security pension in the “no reform” case, multiplied by the
number of people in the retirement age brackets:
TargIncSupTrans(t)=PopRet(t,Reform)*(AvSocSecPension(t,Reform)+
+AveAnnDCPS(t,Reform) - AvSocSecPension(t,NoReform))
The average pensions are calculated according to formulae:
AvSocSecPension(t,Reform) = SocSecTaxe(t,Reform)/PopRet(t,Reform)
AvSocSecPension(t,NoReform) = SocSecTaxe(t,NoReform)/PopRet(t,NoReform)
AveAnnDCPS(t,Reform) = AnnDCPS(t,Reform)/PopRet(t,Reform)
The average pension provided by the PAYG pension system is likely to decrease
during the reform due to a decrease in the social security tax rate (however, this effect
may be partially compensated owing to economic growth, if any). The defined-
contribution component of the pension is supposed to increase due to the development
of this type of pension system. A difference between the number of people in the
retirement age brackets in the case of reform and no reform may appear if the reform
includes changes in the retirement age.
The receipts of the government are calculated as the sum of direct tax, indirect
tax, and social security contributions:
GovReceipts(t) = DirTax(t) + IndirTax(t) +SocSecContr(t)
The interest payments to be paid in year t are calculated as a multiplication of
the interest rate in year t and the governmental debt in year t-1.
IntPayments(t)=r(t)*GovDebt(t-1)
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4. SIMULATIONS
4.1. Scenarios
Scenarios are defined according to three criteria:
The first criterion is the share of the informal sector in the economy. We
assumed that the share of the informal sector is currently 0.5 and proposed three groups
of scenarios:
• The share of the informal sector will remain 0.5 during the next 30 years;
• The share will decrease to 0.3 during this period;
• The share will decrease to 0.2.
The second criterion is the duration of the reform. It was assumed that during 15
years of reform total contributions of employers and employees to a defined-
contribution pension system would increase from 0% to 7% of the total wage bill. Three
groups of scenarios were generated based on the assumption that the government will
decrease twice the rate of the social security tax related to the PAYG system, moving it
close to  the average in industrialized countries:
• During 5 years;
• During 15 years;
• During 25 years.
The last criterion for generating the scenarios is retirement age. Two groups of
scenarios were based on assumptions that
• The retirement age will remain the same (55 years for women and 60 years for men;
• The retirement age will be increased to 65 years for both men and women during the
first 10 years of the reform.
Thus, in total there are 18 scenarios (Table 3). Obviously, they do not cover all
the possible variants of pension reform in the country, and different scenarios have
different probabilities of realization (for instance, the scenario where the social security
tax is declining slowly and the share of the informal sector in the economy is shrinking
fast has a lower probability than one where these parameters decline synchronously,
since high taxes are one of the main reasons for informalization of the economy).
However, this set of scenarios allows us to investigate the dependency of the success of
the reform on those factors, which, as was shown in the previous chapter, are most
significant for reform.
4.2. Results
The simulations were made for a period of 30 years with the reform starting in the year
2000 (the choice of the year, however, is arbitrary and delaying implementation by a
few years would not affect the results drastically). We focused on the level of interest
payments on the governmental debt related to the formal GDP for the period of reform.
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Obviously, if the payments for some scenario exceed 20% of the formal GDP (share of
government consumption in GDP for industrialized countries), this is likely to cause a
collapse in the economy, and, therefore, the implementation of this reform scenario is
impossible. Table 3 shows the results of the simulations.
Table 3. Interest payments for the governmental debt for different scenarios of the
pension reform.
Interest payments (% of formal GDP)
#
Share of
informal
sector
Term of
reform
Retirement
age
(female/male) 2000 2010 2020 2030
1 65/65 9.55 8.14 3.35 0.99
2
25 years
55/60 9.55 13.04 13.70 >20
3 65/65 9.55 10.19 8.47 6.96
4
15 years
55/60 9.55 17.71 >20 >20
5 65/65 9.55 >20 >20 >20
6
Decreases
to 20%
during 30
years 5 years
55/60 9.55 >20 >20 >20
7 65/65 9.55 9.92 6.27 3.89
8
25 years
55/60 9.55 16.43 >20 >20
9 65/65 9.55 12.24 14.22 >20
10
15 years
55/60 9.55 >20 >20 >20
11 65/65 9.55 >20 >20 >20
12
Decreases
to 30%
during 30
years 5 years
55/60 9.55 >20 >20 >20
13 65/65 9.55 14.73 >20 >20
14
25 years
55/60 9.55 >20 >20 >20
15 65/65 9.55 >20 >20 >20
16
15 years
55/60 9.55 >20 >20 >20
17 65/65 9.55 >20 >20 >20
18
Remains
50%
5 years
55/60 9.55 >20 >20 >20
4.3. Analysis of the results
The results of the simulations show that, first, the share of the informal sector in the
economy plays an enormous role in success or failure of the reform. One can see that for
scenarios where the share of the informal sector in the economy decreases to 20%, the
interest payments for the governmental debt do not exceed 20% of the formal GDP in 2
out of 6 cases; for those where the share decreases to 30% in 1 case; and for those where
the share remains 50% in 0 cases. For the latter even in the most favorable case
(scenario # 13), where the decline of the social security tax takes place during 25 years
and the retirement age is increased, the interest payments, according to our simulations,
have a clear trend towards growth (Figure 8), i.e. the pension reform is impossible if the
informal sector comprises 50% of the economy.
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Figure 8. Dynamics of the interest payments on the governmental debt for scenario #13.
Second, the results show that a reduction of the social security tax in 5 years is
impossible in any case, in 15 years is possible in 1 out of 6 cases, and in 25 years is
possible in 4 out of 6 cases. Undertaking the pension reform over 15 years does not lead
to huge governmental debt if the retirement age is increased and the share of the
informal sector in the economy declines to 20% (scenario #3, Figure 9).
Finally, according to our simulations, the pension reform is unlikely to be
possible without change of the retirement age in any case and only possible with an
increase of retirement age in 3 out of 9 cases. Figure 10 shows the difference in interest
payment dynamics for scenarios 1 and 2 where the informal sector decreases to 20% of
the economy, the term of reform is 25 years, and the retirement age, correspondingly, is
decreased and remains the same. Let us note that as discussed previously, a situation
when the taxes (in particular, the social security tax) are being changed slowly and the
informal sector in the economy is shrinking rapidly, is unlikely to take place in reality.
For any other situation changes in the retirement age are causing an even wider
difference.
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Figure 9. Dynamics of interest payments on the governmental debt for scenario #3.
Figure 10. Dynamics of interest payments on the governmental debt for scenarios #1
and #2.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Due to the severe economic crisis and major changes in the economy, the social security
system in Ukraine based on PAYG principles works extremely ineffectively. The trend
towards an aging population will place an additional pressure on the system after the
turn of that millenium. In such conditions reform based on the introduction of a defined
contribution component to the system looks highly desirable. However, since the
economy is not mature enough, the implementation of such a reform is an extremely
complicated task.
One of the main factors complicating the reform is the huge share of the
informal sector in the economy. The simulations show that if present conditions are
maintained, when the informal sector comprises about 50% of the economy,
implementing the reform will be impossible. With a decrease of the informal sector’s
share, the probability of success of the reform will rapidly increase. Thus we can draw
the conclusion that informalization of the economy has an enormous impact on the
social security system.
Simulations show that under present conditions it is unlikely that the social
security reform in Ukraine can be completed in a short time period.
The reform is unlikely to be successful unless the retirement age is changed.
For more detailed investigations of the interdependencies between the informal
economy and the social security system, it would be reasonable to develop a two-
sectoral model of the economy, including formal and informal sectors. Since the
informalization of the economy is typical of all transition countries, the development of
such a model would be important for the analysis of this significant phenomenon.
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APPENDIX 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE UKRAINIAN PENSION SYSTEM
Administrative and legislative structure of the pension system
The legislative base of the Ukrainian pension system was formed in a period of
socioeconomic crisis. This resulted in a series of laws that aimed to "catch up with the
situation", which caused the pension system to become more complicated and unclear
for the citizens. The assignment and payment of pensions is based on the Law of
Ukraine "On Pension Maintenance" accepted in 1991, and on some other laws
regulating payment of pensions for certain categories of people (laws "On the Status of
People Deputy", "On the State Service", "On Status of Judges", "On the Public
Prosecutor’s Office", "On Pensions of Servicemen and the Officers and Men of the
Agencies of Internal Affairs", "On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of their
Social Security", "On the Basic Principles of Social Security of Labor Veterans and
Other Elderly Citizens", Custom Code of Ukraine). Funding of the pension system is
regulated by the Law of Ukraine "On Tax for Obligatory State Pension Insurance"
adopted in 1997.
In April 1998 the president of Ukraine affirmed Basic Principles of Pension
Reform in Ukraine. Aiming at their implementation, the cabinet of ministers submitted
to the parliament drafts of the Laws of Ukraine "On Obligatory Pension Insurance" and
"On Non-State Pension Funds".
According to the Basic Principles, the main tasks of the pension reform in
Ukraine are as follows:
• To realize the constitutional rights of citizens to social security;
• To create conditions for the development of insurance principles in the pension
system;
• To increase the personal interest and personal responsibility of the worker for his/her
living standard after retirement;
• To more seriously take into account the results of a worker’s career to determine the
pension level;
• To reduce demographic pressure on the financial basis of the pension system;
• To introduce a non-state pension insurance.
The Basic Principles stipulate the multistage introduction of a multipillar
pension system in Ukraine. The pension reform is expected to have three stages.
In the first stage it is planned to carry out the reform of an obligatory pension
insurance, decrease the number of preferential treatments and compensations in the
pension system, divide financial sources for different types of pensions, liquidate debts
in pensions payments, and develop a system of the minimum state social standards.
During the second stage the reform of the administrative structure of the pension
system should be maintained, an additional non-state pension should be introduced,
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social pensions should be transferred to the system of social assistance, and in favorable
conditions the defined-benefit pension system should be introduced.
The third stage stipulates providing the minimum social standards for the
population and full realization of the multipillar pension system.
The administrative structure of the pension system includes three organizations.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy is responsible for setting state policy
and developing drafts of laws in the field of the pension system, assignment and
calculating the pension level according to legislative regulations, controlling the use of
the funds of the Pension Fund of Ukraine, development of international cooperation in
the field of the pension system, and promotion of the development of non-state pension
systems.
The Pension Fund collects the social security contributions into the fund through
its regional branches and keeps them on account in a special postal-pension bank.
The ministry of communications provides pension payments through the local
post offices.
According to the Basic Principles of Pension Reform in Ukraine, the functions
of assignment and paying of state labor pensions are expected to be fulfilled by the
Pension Fund of Ukraine after the implementation of individualized registration of
contribution for obligatory state pension insurance.
Types and criteria of pension assignment and pension level calculation
According to the Law of Ukraine "On Pension Maintenance", there are two basic types
of pensions: labor pensions and social pensions.
Labor pensions include four types of pensions: old-age pensions, invalidity
pensions, survivor pensions, and time of service pensions.
Old-age pensions are assigned to people who have reached retirement age and
have the necessary working record. The level of an old-age pension is 55% of the
average monthly wage, but cannot be less then the minimum pension. The pension is to
be increased by 1% each full year of service, but this increment cannot be more than
75% of the pension. The minimum pension is defined by the parliament, the maximum
is three times (for representatives of some professions and persons having suffered from
the Chernobyl disaster – four times) more than the minimum pension. If the working
record is not sufficient, the level of pension is pro-rata-tempore of the full pension, but
not less then 30% of the minimum old-age pension.
Invalidity pensions are assigned to people who have partially or totally lost their
working capacity. To be eligible for invalidity pensions one should have a working
record of 1 - 15 years depending on age. Depending on the degree of capacity loss,
disabled persons are categorized into three groups. The invalidity pension level is for
group 1, 70% of earnings; for group 2, 60% of earnings; and for group 3, 40% of
earnings. The minimum labor invalidity pension is equal to the social pension for the
respective disability group; the maximum pension is three (four) minimal ones.
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Survivor pensions are assigned to disabled dependents of the deceased worker.
The level of pension is 30% of the worker’s earnings, but not less than the social pension
for respective category of disabled.
The years of service pensions are assigned to people whose professions might
cause the loss of their working capacity prior to their normal retirement age. The service
pension level is determined analogously with the age pension level.
Average monthly wages for determining the levels of labor pensions are
calculated (according to the choice of the person, requesting a pension) either over the
last 24 months of work without interruption before retirement, or over 60 months of
work without interruption during the whole working career. Earnings exceeding 10
minimum wages are not considered for the pension level determination. That part of the
earnings which is not higher than four minimum wages is taken into full account, the
fifth minimum wage is calculated with a coefficient 0.85, the sixth minimum wage with
a coefficient 0.7, the seventh with 0.55, the eighth with 0.40, the ninth with 0.25, and
the tenth with 0.15.
According to the laws of Ukraine, there is an exception for some state workers
whose pensions are placed at the level of 50% to 90% of their earnings without a
maximum limit.
War veterans and persons having special labor services are entitled to receive an
increment for their pension at a level from 50% to 400% of the minimum labor age
pension.
Social pensions are assigned to invalids, persons having reached retirement age,
and children who lose the working parent’s income if they do not have an entitlement to
labor pensions. The social pension level for different categories of beneficiaries are from
30% to 200% of the minimum old-age pension.
Retirement age and working record
The retirement age in Ukraine is 60 years for men and 55 years for women. The working
record necessary to get a full pension is 25 years for men and 20 years for women. For
people with dangerous jobs, the retirement age is decreased to 55 years for men and 50
years for women, and the necessary working record is decreased to 20 and 15 years for
men and women, respectively. According to the Ukrainian laws, the periods when a
person does not contribute to the Pension Fund (military service, studying at the
university, childcare) are also included in the working record. People who reach
retirement age have a right to pension payment regardless of whether they continue to
work or not.
Social Security taxes and expenses of the Pension Fund
According to the law, employers must contribute 32% of the total wages of their
companies to the Pension Fund (if employees of the company have a right to
preferential treatment, this rate is higher), employees contribute 1% of the wage, and
self-employed workers and lawyers pay 32% of their earnings (until February 1996 -
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9%). The reserves of the Pension Fund are not included in the state budget, other
budgets, and funds. The only admissible operation directed toward reproduction of the
fund reserves is a purchase of state securities.
Funds of the Pension Fund are spent as follows:
• Payment of the labor and social pensions specified in the laws;
• Child care assistance and under-age child assistance, defined by the law;
• Additional monetary payments to the retirees due to retail price increases;
• Realization of the state programs in the field of social support of retirees, disabled,
children, and other categories of people;
• Organization of current activities, supply of equipment, maintenance of managerial
structures of the Fund, and providing population with information about activities of
the Fund.
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APPENDIX 2. MODEL SPECIFICATION
This model is based on MacKellar and Reisen (1998a, 1998b). Unless required for
purposes of clarity, the time argument is suppressed.
Population, labor force, employment, and households
The population is divided into three age groups: population under the working age (0-14
years), the working-age population, and the retirement-age population:
retwork PopPopPop = Pop ++−140*
Age-specific labor-force participation rates are exogenous assumptions:
retwork LabForceLabForce = LabForce   * +
workworkwork
rtRateLabForcePaPop = LabForce  
retretret
rtRateLabForcePaPop = LabForce  
as are age-specific unemployment rates:
retwork EmpEmp= Emp  * +
( )workworkwork UnEmpRateLabForce = Emp −1 
( )retretret UnEmpRateLabForce = Emp −1 
Output and rates of return to factors
Gross domestic product (GDP) is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function and
rates of return to factors are neoclassical:
( )ββ
α
−
+
1*)1( EMPK g = GDP t
( )K / GDP  = R β
( )*1( EMP / GDP ) = W β−
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where g is the rate of total factor productivity growth; R is the gross profit rate,
including depreciation and indirect taxes net of subsidies; and W is the rate of employee
compensation, including social insurance contributions (workers and employers
contributions to PAYG and defined-contribution pension schemes). In order to net
depreciation and indirect taxes out of the rate of return to capital, we define
[ ]
δ−−  
K
GDPIndTaxRate
 R = r
))((
where IndTaxRate is defined with respect to GDP and δ is the depreciation rate
The structure of capital, its location, and the nature of claims
Capital is either residential (Res) or nonresidential (NonRes); the latter is further
subdivided into capital operated by private unincorporated enterprises (PUEs) and
capital operated by firms, i.e., corporate enterprises.  Residential capital and capital
operated by PUEs are held by households directly. Financial claims on this capital are
held on behalf of households by institutions that collect dividends and pay out annuities.
These institutions are subdivided into those that comprise the fully funded
defined-contribution pension system (DCPS) and other institutions (OIs) such as banks
and mutual funds. Firms in the model operate capital, either distributing or reinvesting
earnings that accrue; they do not own shares in other firms. In summary,
 KOI KDCPS KPUE sK = K +++Re
The age structure of capital ownership. Ideally, each cohort should be tracked as it
accumulates capital during its working life and draws it down during retirement.  An
expedient measure is to share down the aggregate capital stock by age of owner.  The
assumption is made that the age structure of all forms of capital (residential and
nonresidential; operated by firms and PUEs; held by the DCPS and OIs) is identical.
Assuming that persons under 15 do not own capital, for all types of capital we have:
 KShareK= K workwork  *
 KShareK= K workret )-(1 *
This leaves us with the problem of estimating the share variable.  In MacKellar and
Reisen (1998a), a model from demography is presented that results in the following
expression:
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where AR is the average age of the population over retirement age, and AW is the average
age of the population  in working age.
Income, outlay, and net saving of households
Income, outlay, and net saving of the population in working age. Persons of working
age receive wage income, entrepreneurial income in the form of profits from PUEs,
imputed rental services of residential capital, and transfers from persons aged over
retirement age. Pre-tax income in this age group is thus:
workretworkworkworkwork TransPop ntYPop EntrYPopWageYPop = YPop ,Re +++
Income, outlay, and net saving related to wage income. Out of pre-tax wage income,
persons of working age pay direct taxes and social insurance contributions, the latter
consisting of contributions to the public PAYG social security system and the DCPS.
workwork EmpW = WageYPop  
workworkworkwork
rWageYPopSocInsContYPopDirTaxWage WageYPop = opDispWageYP −−
The direct tax rate is defined with respect to income:
workwork EmpWDirTaxRate = YPopDirTaxWage   
The direct tax rate is assumed to apply equally to all factor incomes.  Social insurance
contributions consist of contributions to the public PAYG defined-benefit public
pension system and the DCPS:
workworkwork geYPopDCPSContWatWageYPop SocSecCon= WageYPopSocInsCont +
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PAYG and DCPS contributions are taken out of gross compensation of employees.  The
contribution rate is assumed to be the same for both age groups; therefore, it is not
indexed by age.  It is also assumed to be the same for both wage income and
entrepreneurial income:
workwork WageYPoptRate SocSecCon= WageYPopSocSecCont  
workwork WageYPopteDCPSContRa = geYPopDCPSContWa
Consumption of disposable wage income is calculated by means of an exogenous age-
specific share:
workworkwork opDispWageYPageYPopConsShareW = opConsWageYP  
and what is left over is net saving:
workworkwork opConsWageYPopDispWageYP = eYPopNetSvngWag   −
Income, outlay, and net saving related to KPUEwork. The treatment of entrepreneurial
income derived from PUEs is identical:
workwork KPUEr = EntrYPop  
Income, outlay, and net saving related to KReswork. Imputed rents to residential housing
are taxed similar to any other form of income; the residual is consumed, so there is no
net saving out of this income stream.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to transfers/bequests. All income not consumed
by persons over retirement age is transferred to those of working age. This includes the
annuity value of the wealth of the population in retirement age; in this way, bequests are
“annualized”:
workretworkretworkret TransPopransConsShareT = opConsTransP ,,,  
workretworkretworkret opConsTransPTransPop = nsPopNetSvngTra ,,, −
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Total net savings.  Total net savings are equal to the sum over net savings from the
various income streams:
workret
workworkwork
nsPopNetSvngTra
rYPopNetSvngEnteYPopNetSvngWag = NetSvngPop
,
    
+
++
Income, outlay, and net saving of the population in retirement age. Persons over
retirement age receive wage income if they are still employed, annuity income derived
from their capital assets, and benefits from the public PAYG social security system. The
level of social security benefits is dictated by current revenues flowing into the system
(i.e., we assume that no surplus is accumulated and there is no deficit financed from
general revenue). In order to simplify accounting, persons are assumed to start receiving
social security benefits at retirement age regardless of labor-force status.
For the same reason, annuitization of assets is assumed to commence at
retirement age whether the individual is retired or not.  The retirement age population´s
claims on all forms of capital is translated into annuity income based on the prevailing
rate of return to capital and life expectancy at retirement age.
Total pre-tax income in this age group is:
SocSecBenAnnYPop WageYPop = YPop retretret ++
We proceed to look at each of these components and expenditures out of each income
stream.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to wage income. Wage and entrepreneurial
income of the retirement age population is treated no differently from that of younger
persons.
Income, outlay, and net saving related to KDCPSret , KOIret , KPUEret , and KResret.
Persons over retirement age derive annuity income from the DCPS and OIs, which hold
financial claims on their behalf, and this annuity income is assumed to be untaxed.
 Re retretretretret sAnnValKAnnValKPUEAnnValKOISAnnValKDCP= pDispAnnYPo +++
These annuities for all types of the capital are calculated according to the formula:
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retret
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K= AnnValK Re
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
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No distinction is made between the propensity to consume out of various annuity
streams:
retretret pDispAnnYPonnYPopConsShareA = pConsAnnYPo  
retretret pConsAnnYPopDispAnnYPo = YPopNetSvngAnn   −
Income, outlay, and net saving related to social security benefits. Social security
benefits are assumed to be untaxed.
SocSecBenocSecBenConsShareS = BenConsSocSec  
BenConsSocSec SocSecBen= SecBenNetSvngSoc  −
Transfers/bequests.  Transfers/bequests from the population of retirement age to the
population of working age are calculated as the residual left after consumption has been
deducted from disposable income; i.e., as the sum of net saving from all disposable
income flows:
SecBenNetSvngSoc YPopNetSvngAnn eYPopNetSvngWagTransPop retretret  ++=
Net saving. Given the calculation of transfers/bequests, net saving of the population
aged over retirement age is by definition zero.
Total private consumption. Total consumption in each age group is the sum over all
consumption streams:
workret
workworkworkwork
opConsTransP 
ntYPopConsopConsEntrYP opConsWageYPCons
,
Re
+
++=
BenConsSocSecpConsAnnYPo opConsWageYPCons retretret ++=  
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and total private consumption in the economy is:
retwork Cons ConsivCons +=*Pr
Income, outlay, and net savings of the DCPS and OIs. The DCPS and OIs are dummy
sectors in that they merely hold assets on behalf of households.  The DCPS receives
workers´and employers´ contributions and dividends distributed by firms. Since
corporate profits are taxed when earned, these dividends are assumed to be untaxed.
Disposable income of the DCPS is thus
rmsKDCPSDivDistYFi trYDCPSContEn geYDCPSContWa = DispYDCPS ++ **
The DCPS pays out annuities to retirees; what is left over comprises the net savings of
the pension system:
retSAnnValKDCP DispYDCPS = SNetSvngDCP −
OIs receive dividends in the same way as the DCPS. Because OIs are assumed to
intermediate retirees´ annuitization of their holdings of KPUE and KRes, they are
credited with income streams from these assets:
retret sKrKPUErrmsKOIDivDistYFi = DispYOI Re      ++
Like the DCPS, OIs pay out annuities, and what is left over comprises net savings:
retretret sAnnValKAnnValKPUEAnnValKOI DispYOI = NetSvngOI Re−−−
Net saving of households. Because saving of the population in retirement age is zero
after transfers and bequests have been taken into account, total net saving from
household income is
NetSvngOISNetSvngDCPNetSvngPop = NetSvngHH work ++
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Income, outlay, and net savings of firms
Firms operate capital, earn profits, and pay out direct taxes and dividends. Earnings of
firms are:
  
*KDCPSr = SYFirmsKDCP
  
*KOIr = YFirmsKOI
Direct taxes are paid to the government:
  
*SYFirmsKDCPDirTaxRate = msKDCPSDirTaxYFir
  
*YFirmsKOIDirTaxRate = msKOIDirTaxYFir
Dividend distributions are made out of pre-tax earnings:
  
*SYFirmsKDCPeDivDistRat = rmsKDCPSDivDistYFi
  
*YFirmsKOIeDivDistRat = rmsKOIDivDistYFi
Net savings of firms. Net savings of firms are:
irmsKOI NetSvngYFKDCPSrmsNetSvngYFi = YFirmsNetDomSvng + 1 ,
where
  
-      
rmsKDCPSDivDistYFi-
rmsKDCPS DirTaxYFi-KDCPSYFirms = rmsKDCPSNetSvngYFi
 rmsKOIDivDistYFi-ms KOIDirTaxYFirYFirmsKOI = rmsKOINetSvngYFi     -  
Income, outlay, and net saving of government
Government receives direct taxes, indirect taxes, and contributions to the public social
security system:
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rEntrYPopSocSecContrWageYPopSocSecContIndTaxmsDirTaxYFir
ntYPopDirTaxYPopDirTaxEntrYPopDirTaxWageYGov workwork
++++
++=
Indirect taxes are calculated as:
GDPIndTaxRateIndTax  =
Government expenditure consists of government consumption and social security
benefits, and income minus expenditure gives government net savings as:
SocSecBenGovConsYGovNetSvngGov −−=
Because the public social security system is assumed to be PAYG, social security outlay
is equal to social security revenue:
**
rEntrYPopSocSecContrWageYPopSocSecContSocSecBen +=
In other words, net saving of the public pension system is assumed to be zero.
Government consumption is calculated by means of an exogenous share coefficient:
GDPreGovConsShaGovCons =
Sharing out saving into investment
A major simplifying assumption is that investment is constrained by the supply of
capital, i.e., that investment always equals the amount of savings made available. The
approach followed is to share out available savings into different types of investment,
some mobile and some immobile.
Total net savings are:
NetSvngGovmsNetSvngFirNetSvngHHNetSvngTot ++=
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Residential and nonresidential investment are calculated from savings by means of an
exogenous share coefficient:
ot  NetSvngTsInvSharesdK ReRe =
( )NetSvngTotsInvSharesdKNon  Re1Re −=
Investment in PUEs is estimated as a share of nonresidential investment (apart from
reinvestment of FDI earnings):
sdKNonePUEInvShardKPUE Re=
Total investment minus residential investment minus investment in PUEs equals
investment in capital operated by firms; claims on these are by definition held either by
the DCPS or by OIs.
We assume that change in capital claimed by the DCPS is equal to net savings of
this sector, which is sensible as we have more or less enumerated all the sources and
uses of funds for this sector. The residual, i.e., investment from all savings not mediated
through the DCPS, is assigned to OIs:
SNetSvngDCPdKDCPS =
dKDCPSsdKNondKOI −= Re
Calculation of capital stocks
Capital stocks are cumulated year by year. For any type of capital
dKtKtK +−= )1()( .
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APPENDIX 3. MODEL PARAMETERIZATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
Demographic assumptions
According to the central scenario developed by the IIASA Population Project for
European exUSSR countries (Lutz et al., 1996), we assumed that fertility in Ukraine
will increase to 17 per 1,000 people, and the life expectancy will increase to 67.1 years
for men and 78.8 for women by the year 2030. The IIASA population projection model
was used to provide assumptions on the age structure of the population.
The average age of the working-age population was 35 in 1996. We assume this
will remain constant. The average retirement age can be estimated to be 57, and the life
expectancy at 57 can be estimated to be 19.6 years in 1995. Based on ILO estimates, the
labor age participation rate for the working age population is assumed to be 0.75. The
labor force participation rate for the retired population was 0.15 in Ukraine in 1996. We
assume that due to the stabilization of the economy it will decrease to 0.07 in 2040.
The production function
The β coefficient in the Cobb-Douglas production function was assumed to be 0.33. The
1996 formal per capita GDP level was 1575 Ukrainian Hryvnias. However, this does not
include the informal sector of the economy, which has approximately the same size as
the official one. To take this sector into account, we will assume that the real per capita
GDP level is twice as high as the official one, while real tax rates and the government
consumption rate are assumed to be two times lower than the official ones (real values
given in brackets).
Social security contribution rates
Contributions to DCPS are assumed to be 0 in 1996. The social security contribution
rate was 33% (16.5%); the employers share was 0.97.
Consumption/saving rates
According to national accounts of Ukraine, the savings of households were about 2.2%
of their income. Taking into account this information, we assume that for the working-
age population’s propensity to consume, the disposable wage income, entrepreneurial
income, and transfers/bequests was 0.99, 0.7, and 0.7, respectively, in 1996, which will
decrease to 0.95, 0.5, and 0.5, respectively, by 2027. For the retirement age population
we assume that all income was consumed in 1996, and the consumption rate of wage
income is assumed to decrease to 0.95 in 2027.
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Taxes and government consumption
According to data of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, the direct tax rate
(relative to wages and profits) was 0.19 (0.095) in 1996. The indirect tax rate (relative to
GDP) was 0.10 (0.05). We assume that due to the decrease of the informal sector’s share
in the economy, the real values of these parameters will increase to 0.15 and 0.075 by
2040 and then remain constant. Government consumption was 32% (16%) of GDP in
1996. With the same reasoning we assume that the formal government consumption rate
will decrease to 0.2 in 2027 and will then remain constant.
Residential investment and investment in PUE
The share of net domestic savings allocated to residential investment is assumed to be
20%. The share of private unincorporated enterprises in total investment is assumed to
be 20%.
Initializing capital stocks
According to data of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, the total capital was
762 billion hryvnias in 1996, and the residential capital was 124 billion hyrvnias
(18.5%). The capital of private unincorporated enterprises can be estimated as 76 billion
hryvnias (10%), and the capital of the fully-funded, defined-contribution pension system
is assumed to be 0. Therefore, the capital of other financial institutions is assumed to be
562 billion hryvnias (71.5%). We assume that all capital is installed in Ukraine.
